The Afghanistan war

The Afghanistan war is proving costly, but it’s still right.

Unlike the Iraq conflict, which I strongly opposed, I’ve always felt NATO’s Afghanistan mission in Afghanistan – both to tackle the terrorist threat from the Afghanistan/Pakistan border and to bring stability to this dangerous region.

However, I’ve long argued NATO’s strategy in Afghanistan has been wrong.

During President Bush’s time, it was almost as if there was no war in Afghanistan – the American effort there was totally subordinated to Iraq.

Indeed, Iraq was a disaster for the mission in Afghanistan, as that illegal war split the international coalition assembled after 9/11 and diverted political leadership and military resources from the fight against the Taliban.

Yet there are still political and military leaders who think we can win a war in Afghanistan by military might alone.

History says that’s not possible – whether it was the problems Alexander the Great faced, or the British in the three Anglo-Afghan wars of the 19th century or indeed the more recent defeat of the Russians.

History does say that you win by splitting your opponents. By persuading local tribal leaders to switch sides. By getting some of your enemy to defect.

That means we need a political surge – not just a military surge. We need to see reconciliation, to persuade Afghan insurgents who aren’t really Taleban, to defect.

That means grassroots diplomacy - or as I’ve called it “tea drinking diplomacy”, the traditional way of settling disputes and making deals in Afghanistan.  

Some in President Obama’s team do now think this. But we urgently need such a change in strategy in Afghanistan, before it’s too late.